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 This article endeavours to find answers to the question of why the 
victims of sexual harassment often resign after the harassment, 
while the perpetrator continues working, and suggests how some 
of the human cost to victims of sexual harassment can be 
prevented. E v Ikwezi Municipality provides a classic example of 
how the failure of the employer to protect the victim exacerbated 
her suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
eventually leaving her with no option but to resign. Had the 
employer conducted a risk analysis, it could have prevented the 
sexual harassment by alerting employees to the content of the 
Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment in 
the Workplace. Further, had the employer been aware that it was 
responsible for the victim's psychological safety also after the 
disciplinary hearing, it could have taken measures to ensure her 
safety. The unsatisfactory sanction (the harasser was not 
dismissed) could lastly have been referred to the Labour Court for 
review. Unfortunately, the wrong legal advice and an incompetent 
chairperson led to the municipality’s failing adequately to protect 
the victim. This caused (and aggravated) the symptoms of PTSD, 
which forced the victim to resign. 
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1 Introduction 
The #MeToo movement, sparked by allegations of sexual harassment 
against Harvey Weinstein and other high profile men in the entertainment 
industry,1 highlighted the continuous and widespread abuse of women in 
the workplace by men in positions of power.2 Despite the common-law 
liability of employers, legislation imposing liability for sexual harassment on 
employers,3 and a Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace,4 sexual harassment is still ruining the lives 
(and careers) of many women in the workplace in South Africa. The 
harassers are often not dismissed, with the result that the victims must then 
carry on with their jobs while being in the constant presence of their 
harassers. Often these victims cannot cope with the stress resulting from 
this, and as a result, they are forced to resign, while the perpetrators carry 
on with their jobs.5  
In this article I endeavour to analyse the reasons for this injustice to victims 
of sexual harassment by analysing E v Ikwezi Municipality,6 a 2016 
judgment of the South African High Court. The question that I ask is how 
the pain and suffering, psychological damages, and loss of a job (to the 
victim/employee) and the financial loss (to the employer – in this case a 
municipality), could have been prevented. Ikwezi concerns an employee's 
claim based on the vicarious liability and direct liability of her employer for 
sexual harassment by her immediate supervisor. The chairperson of the 
                                            
*  Karin Calitz. BA (SU) LLB LLM (RAU) LLD (Unisa). Emeritus Professor, Mercantile 
Law, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Email: kbc@sun.ac.za. My thanks to the 
two anonymous reviewers for their helpful recommendations. 
1 BBC News 2018 http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672: "After a 
four-month investigation, New York state prosecutors announce they have filed a 
lawsuit against the Weinstein Company on the basis the studio failed to protect 
employees from his alleged harassment and abuse". 
2  Cooney 2018 http://time.com/5015204/harvey-weinstein-scandal/. 
3  Employers could be held liable for constructive dismissal in terms of s 186(1) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), which could constitute an automatically 
unfair dismissal, and also on the ground of discrimination in terms of s 6(1) and s 60 
of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA). 
4  Amended Code on the Handling of Sexual Harassment cases in the Workplace - 
Gen N 1357 in GG 27865 of 4 August 2005. In item 4 of the Code sexual harassment 
is defined as "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the rights of an 
employee and constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace, taking into account all 
of the following factors: whether the harassment is on the prohibited grounds of sex 
and/or gender and/or sexual orientation; whether the sexual conduct was 
unwelcome; the nature and extent of the sexual conduct; and the impact of the 
sexual conduct on the employee".  
5  See Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 25 ILJ 439 (C) (hereafter the Grobler HC case); 
Ntsabo v Real Security CC 2003 24 ILJ 2341 (LC) (hereafter the Ntsabo case); Piliso 
v Old Mutual 2007 28 ILJ 897 (LC) (hereafter the Piliso case).  
6  E v Ikwezi Municipality 2016 37 ILJ 1799 (ECG) (hereafter the Ikwezi case). 
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disciplinary hearing gave the harasser a slap on the wrist, whereafter the 
latter continued working while the victim, who was unable to cope with the 
situation, resigned approximately a year after the incident. Ikwezi mirrors 
the story of countless other cases of sexual harassment in which the victims 
are forced to resign (or wish to resign but cannot do so for financial reasons) 
because of the second trauma,7 namely the unbearable situation of having 
to continue working with their assailants, because of a lack of protection by 
their employers.8  
I firstly analyse the Ikwezi judgment, specifically the vicarious as well as 
direct liability of the employer for the sexual harassment of the victim. 
Secondly, I argue that the employer, in neglecting its duty to protect the 
victim against physical and psychological damages, contributed to her 
damages. I further argue that an assessment of the risk that sexual 
harassment could take place in the particular circumstances could have 
prevented the harassment and ensuing damages. Lastly, I point out that a 
botched disciplinary hearing presided over by an incompetent chairperson, 
as well as ignorance of the municipality of its right to refer the decision of 
the disciplinary chairman for review, exacerbated the victim's damages. 
These factors led to her resignation and a claim for more than R4 million 
against the municipality. Although outside the ambit of this case note, I 
briefly discuss the possibility that employers, in certain limited 
circumstances, have the option to hold a second hearing or to unilaterally 
change an unsatisfactory sanction to one of dismissal, if the seriousness of 
the misconduct warrants such a change. 
2 The facts in Ikwezi 
The plaintiff worked for the Ikwezi Local Municipality (the Municipality) as 
an archives clerk at their Jansenville offices. Her immediate superior, Xola 
Jack, who held the position of Corporate Services Manager, was stationed 
at the Klipplaat offices of the Municipality. His job entailed that he often had 
to visit the Jansenville offices and that he and the plaintiff had to work closely 
together. They sometimes had to work after hours to prepare council 
agendas. On one such occasion, Jack made a suggestion to the plaintiff 
which had a sexual connotation. The victim indicated that she was not 
interested.9  
Approximately three weeks after this incident, Jack came into the plaintiff's 
office, walked straight up to her where she was sitting behind her desk, bent 
over her and tried to force his tongue into her mouth. He was unsuccessful 
only because she clenched her teeth. She struggled to free herself from his 
                                            
7  See Calitz 2011 SA Merc LJ 280. 
8  See Grobler HC, Ntsabo and Piliso.  
9  Ikwezi para 10. 
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grip and eventually succeeded in pushing him away but was left with a 
mouthful of his saliva. She was "distressed and anxious" and found the 
incident to be "utterly revolting".10  
She immediately attempted to report the incident to her senior managers, 
but they were unavailable at that time.11 The next day she had a meeting 
with the acting mayor and acting municipal manager who were sympathetic 
and placed her on special leave for a few days. They also undertook to keep 
Jack away from her until the departmental enquiry into the incident had been 
finalised. Until such time she was instructed to report to the acting municipal 
manager and not to Jack. He was instructed not to visit the Jansenville 
offices without written permission from the municipal manager and not to 
contact the plaintiff. This arrangement was found to be impractical and Jack 
was consequently instructed to phone the municipal manager prior to his 
visiting the Jansenville offices so that the plaintiff could be warned to keep 
out of his way. The municipal manager later testified that this was to ensure 
that "she did not become a victim twice".12 The manager was thus aware of 
the danger of not protecting the plaintiff after the incident. The telephonic 
arrangement also did not work because the municipal manager was often 
unavailable when the necessary permission had to be obtained.13 The 
plaintiff was as a result often confronted with her harasser's presence and 
at such times she was traumatised and started crying.14  
The plaintiff instituted criminal proceedings against Jack in the magistrate's 
court for sexual assault. He pleaded guilty and a suspended term of 
imprisonment was imposed. A disciplinary hearing was held at work at the 
same time and he was found guilty of misconduct. The charge at the 
disciplinary hearing was that he had tried to kiss the victim, which the court 
later pointed out was the wrong charge, since he in fact tried to force his 
tongue into her mouth, which differed vastly from a kiss.15 A sanction of a 
written warning and two weeks suspension without pay was imposed. This 
is surprising, considering the seriousness of the misconduct. In several 
South African cases the seriousness of sexual harassment in circumstances 
where the harasser was a senior person in a power relationship with the 
victim had been emphasised.16  
                                            
10  Ikwezi para 12. 
11  Ikwezi para 13. 
12  Ikwezi para 27. 
13  Ikwezi para 34. 
14  Ikwezi para 24. 
15  Ikwezi para 36. 
16  Campbell Scientific Africa (Pty) Ltd v Simmers 2016 37 ILJ 116 (LAC) (hereafter the 
Campbell case) in which the dismissal of an employee who merely invited the victim 
to his room and asked her "Do you want a lover tonight?" was found to be fair. Also 
see Gaga v Anglo-Platinum Ltd 2012 33 ILJ 329 (LAC) para 49 and South African 
Broadcasting Corporation v Grogan 2006 27 ILJ 1519 (LC) 1532A, para 51. 
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The chairperson further made the following astonishing remark:  
[Al]though the employer does have committed a serious misconduct during 
May 2009, I think that this Council needs to uplift the skills of their employee's 
by introducing a skills development plan (sic).17 
In the High Court, Pickering J attempted to explain that the chairperson 
probably referred to Jack when he referred to the "employer" and further 
that he meant that the Municipality should inform employees of its sexual 
harassment policies18 (and not uplift their skills through a skills development 
plan).  
The High Court remarked that "it is a matter of very considerable surprise 
that the presiding officer did not consider dismissal as an appropriate 
sanction, especially in the light of the second defendant's previous warning 
for theft of municipal property".19  
The court further remarked that Jack’s conduct  
was an intolerable, despicable and violent abuse of his position of authority 
over her and a two week suspension in no way reflected the gravity of his 
offence. There is to my mind, no doubt whatsoever that Rhoode's award 
measured against the charge on which second defendant had been convicted 
together with his previous infraction was grossly unreasonable and the 
conclusion is inescapable that Rhoode did not apply his mind properly to the 
issue of an appropriate sanction. The awful irony is that, because of this, the 
second defendant continues with his employment … whilst the plaintiff has 
been forced to resign because of her Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.20  
The municipal manager later testified that he was extremely critical of the 
sanction that had been imposed, but that the Municipality's legal advisor 
was of the opinion that there was nothing that they could do after Jack had 
served the two-week suspension.21 The Municipality thus considered itself 
bound by a sanction which was highly inappropriate, imposed by a clearly 
incompetent chairperson. Consequently, although the municipal manager 
was sympathetic, had a high regard for the victim as an employee,22 and 
knew about the effect that the harasser's presence had on her, he informed 
her that there was nothing more that he could do, since a disciplinary 
hearing had been held and a sanction had been imposed. 
The plaintiff thus had to live with the burden of working together with her 
harasser. She saw the harasser quite often and she testified that on such 
occasions she suffered anxiety attacks. These encounters aggravated the 
                                            
17  Ikwezi para 22. 
18  Ikwezi para 37. 
19  Ikwezi para 37 
20  Ikwezi para 37. 
21  Ikwezi para 29. 
22  Ikwezi para 40. 
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Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from which she suffered23 and 
approximately one year after the incident she found the situation to be so 
unbearable that she could no longer cope with her job. She resigned and 
instituted a claim for damages in the High Court. 
3 Employers' liability for the sexual harassment of their 
employees 
A victim of sexual harassment has several remedies at her disposal. She 
could claim damages in terms of the common law on the ground that her 
employer is vicariously or directly liable for such damages.24 She could also 
base her claim on the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) in terms of 
which harassment constitutes discrimination. Employers could be held liable 
for the harassment of one employee by another of their employees in terms 
of section 60 of the EEA.25 Section 186(1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 (LRA) presents a further remedy in the form of constructive dismissal, 
which could constitute an automatically unfair dismissal if the employee was 
a victim of sexual harassment.26 However, to avoid constructive dismissal 
and retain their jobs, victims may possibly also rely on the common-law right 
to implied trust and confidence in the employment contract to secure an 
order of specific performance against their employers.27 
The victim in Ikwezi chose to claim damages in the High Court in terms of 
the common law. She alleged that the employer was vicariously liable for 
Jack's actions and further that the employer was directly liable on account 
of negligence. The basis of her direct liability claim was the fact that the 
employer knew about the trauma that the presence of Jack caused and that 
the employer had neglected its legal duty to protect her against such 
trauma.28 It is significant that she resigned only about a year after the 
incident, indicating that it was not so much the sexual harassment itself but 
rather the trauma suffered afterwards caused by her having to work with her 
harasser and having to constantly see him that aggravated the PTSD which 
eventually led to her resignation.  
                                            
23  The psychological impact of the continued presence of the harasser also led to the 
resignation of the plaintiffs in Ntsabo, Grobler HC and Piliso. The plaintiff in Mokone 
v Sahara Computers (Pty) Ltd 2010 31 ILJ 2827 (GNP) considered resigning, but as 
an only breadwinner she was unable to do so. 
24  See Grobler HC and Media 24 Ltd v Grobler 2005 26 ILJ 1007 (SCA) (hereafter the 
Grobler SCA case).  
25  See Ntsabo. 
26  Christian v Colliers Properties 2005 ZALC 56 (25 February 2005). 
27  Bosch 2006 ILJ 52. 
28  Ikwezi para 4. 
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4 Direct liability 
The representatives of the Municipality did not deny that they had a legal 
duty to protect the victim, but alleged that they complied with this duty by 
warning the victim whenever Jack had to attend the Jansenville office, by 
instructing him not to contact the victim and by instituting a disciplinary 
hearing.29 They later conceded that these measures did not protect the 
plaintiff adequately, but alleged that they only had this duty during the 
narrow period between the act and the disciplinary hearing. It was what 
happened after this period which finally had a severe psychological impact 
on the victim and eventually led to her resignation. The view that they had 
a duty to protect her only during the said narrow period is, in the light of 
jurisprudence, clearly incorrect. In Media 24 v Grobler30 and Piliso v Old 
Mutual31 it was emphasised that employers indeed have a duty to protect 
employees against physical as well as psychological harm during their 
employment period. There is no authority for narrowing down this duty to 
only the period between the unlawful act and the disciplinary hearing. 
Serious sexual harassment should almost without exception lead to 
dismissal, which would prevent a situation where the victim and harasser 
would have to work together. However, if the harasser is not dismissed, the 
duty of the employer towards the employee to ensure her safety will 
continue for the duration of the working relationship. 
Pickering J in Ikwezi remarked that the Municipality rightly conceded that 
they had a legal duty to protect the complainant after the incident and up to 
the disciplinary hearing, that they failed to protect her, and that they were 
thus liable for the damages that she suffered during this period. The court 
left open the question of liability for the period after the disciplinary hearing 
and proceeded to establish that the employer was vicariously liable for the 
complainant's damages. It is not clear why the court did not consider the 
direct liability of the employer for the period after the disciplinary hearing; 
apparently because this was unnecessary given the fact that her claim 
based on vicarious liability was successful. 
It is submitted that the Municipality had a duty to ensure the psychological 
safety of the claimant even after the disciplinary hearing and that they 
should have made arrangements to ensure this. It was clear that the 
presence of the harasser caused the victim to have anxiety attacks and that 
it had a profound negative effect on her psychological well-being. The 
Municipality had a duty to take measures by for instance deploying the 
harasser to a job not entailing his having to visit the offices where the 
employee worked. The court disappointingly did not examine the duty of the 
                                            
29  Ikwezi para 6. 
30  Grobler SCA para 65. 
31  Piliso para 80.  
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employer for the psychological safety of the employee in the period after the 
disciplinary hearing. This would have emphasised that employers do bear 
this duty and would have encouraged employers to take the necessary 
measures to ensure the protection of the victim.  
5 Vicarious liability 
The requirements for an employer to be held liable on the ground of 
vicarious liability are trite; namely that there existed an employment 
relationship, that the employee acted unlawfully, that the act caused 
damage to the claimant, and lastly, that the act was performed within the 
course and scope of the employee's employment.32  
This last requirement often leads to difficulties in the so-called "deviation 
cases", where the employee was not merely negligent, but acted in his or 
her own interests,33 and especially where the employee wilfully committed 
an unlawful act,34 as in Ikwezi. 
Grobler v Naspers35 was the first South African case which extended the 
vicarious liability of the employer to an act of sexual harassment. The court 
in Grobler HC conducted a thorough analysis of vicarious liability for sexual 
harassment in several other jurisdictions. In Canada, the ground-breaking 
Canadian decision in Bazley v Curry36 emphasised the need for sufficient 
closeness of the employee's unlawful conduct to the enterprise risk, for 
imposing vicarious liability in the case of intentional torts: 
[I]n determining the sufficiency of the connection between the employer's 
creation or enhancement of the risk and the wrong complained of … the 
relevant factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:  
(a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or 
her power;  
(b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer's 
aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed by the 
employee);  
(c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation 
or intimacy inherent in the employer's enterprise; 
(d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; 
and  
                                            
32  Calitz 2005 TSAR 216.  
33  Calitz 2005 TSAR 218.  
34  Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (A); K v Minister of Safety and Security 
2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC); F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 33 ILJ 93 (CC). 
35  Grobler HC. 
36  Bazley v Curry 1999 174 DLR (4th) 45 (hereafter the Bazley case). 
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(e) the vulnerability of potential victims to the wrongful exercise of the 
employee's power. 
The House of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall37 was guided by the decision in 
Bazley. The court in Lister, as in Bazley, had to decide whether a charity 
could be held liable for the sexual harassment of vulnerable children in its 
care facilities. In Lister the court endorsed the test requiring a close 
connection or sufficient connection between the unlawful act and the duties 
of the employee as formulated in Bazley.38  
The court in Grobler HC applied the factors (enumerated by the court in 
Bazley) that would indicate such a close connection, and held that the 
enterprise indeed enhanced the risk that the supervisor would harass Ms 
Grobler.39 The court regarded the constitutional rights to inherent dignity, 
bodily integrity and equality as a further ground for imposing vicarious 
liability.40  
On appeal in Grobler SCA, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) confirmed 
the amount of damages that the High Court ordered, but held the employer 
directly liable on the alternative claim that Media 24 negligently failed to 
ensure the victim's safety. Here the court held as follows:  
It is clear in my opinion that the legal convictions of the community require an 
employer to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of its 
employees in the workplace and to be obliged to compensate the victim for 
harm caused thereby should it negligently fail to do so.41  
The court held the employer directly liable on the ground that the victim's 
supervisors knew that she was being harassed and nevertheless negligently 
failed in their duty to protect her psychological safety.42 Although the SCA 
held the employer directly liable for failing to protect the employee, the court 
did not find that the employer was not also vicariously liable. The 
development of the doctrine of vicarious liability in Grobler HC is thus still 
good law. 
One year after the judgment in Grobler SCA, the Constitutional Court in K v 
Minister of Safety and Security43 and later on in F v Minister of Safety and 
Security44 applied the "sufficiently close connection" test to include the act 
of rape, which can be seen as the most intensive form of sexual harassment. 
The "sufficiently close connection" test used in these cases to establish 
                                            
37  Lister v Hesley Hall 2001 UKHL 22 (hereafter the Lister case). 
38  See Lister paras 28 and 50. 
39  Grobler HC 297. 
40  Grobler HC 298. 
41  Grobler SCA para 68. 
42  Grobler SCA para 65. 
43  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC). 
44  F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 33 ILJ 93 (CC). 
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whether the perpetrators acted within the course and scope of their 
employment establishes that even though the perpetrator did not act in the 
interests of his employer, and acted subjectively in his own interest, 
objectively speaking there was still a close enough connection to his duties 
and the relevant act to still hold the employer liable.45 The dignity, privacy 
and bodily integrity of the victims, and in the case of the police force, their 
constitutional duty to protect the public, were important factors in finding that 
the employer was vicariously liable. 
The "sufficiently close connection" test, looked at through the "prism of the 
constitution", was followed in other cases46 and is now well embedded in 
South African law.  
As remarked above, Grobler HC was the first South African case which 
extended the vicarious liability of the employer to an act of sexual 
harassment of one of its employees by another employee. Ikwezi is the 
second of this kind. In between Grobler HC and Ikwezi, K and F were 
decided, but did not change the "sufficiently close connection" test on which 
the liability of the employer was founded in Grobler HC. Although the 
Constitutional Court in K and F did not rely on enterprise risk to facilitate a 
close connection, but rather focussed on the trust that the public should be 
able to place in the police force to enable them to do their job,47 the trust 
relationship could be seen as closely aligned to the risk that an enterprise 
places in the community. It is the trust of the victim in the perpetrator (based 
on his special position) that places the perpetrator in a position to harm the 
victim. 
The court in Ikwezi set out to develop the common-law doctrine of vicarious 
liability to include the sexual harassment of an employee by another 
superior employee.48 The court quoted Ponnan J in City of Cape Town v 
South African National Roads Authority Ltd,49 who warned against 
"overzealous reform".50 Mindful of this warning, the court nevertheless found 
in the light of the test developed by the Constitutional Court in K and 
followed in F that the employer in Ikwezi could be held liable because the 
position of authority in which the perpetrator was placed had the effect that 
the victim "trusted him implicitly" and further "it was because of the nature 
of their employment relationship that the opportunity presented itself to [the] 
                                            
45  The then Appellate Division in Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (A) 
formulated this test.  
46  See Minister of Defence v Von Beneke 2013 2 SA 361 (SCA). 
47  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC) para 52; Minister of Safety 
and Security v F 2012 33 ILJ 93 (CC) para 62 et seq. 
48  Ikwezi para 70. 
49  City of Cape Town v South African National Roads Authority Ltd 2015 3 SA 386 
(SCA). 
50  Ikwezi para 29. 
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second defendant".51 This development of the common law by the court was 
not strictly necessary as the High Court in Grobler HC had already in 2005 
developed the doctrine of vicarious liability to include the sexual harassment 
of a secretary by her superior.  
The court in Ikwezi found that the position of trust in which the employer 
placed Jack, as Corporate Services Manager, facilitated the act of sexual 
harassment.52 The nature of the work (working closely together with the 
plaintiff after hours) gave him the opportunity to harass the plaintiff, who was 
in a vulnerable position.  
Although vicarious liability is a form of faultless liability and can be imposed 
independently from the employer-imposed measures to prevent unlawful 
conduct, one of the theories providing justification for such strict liability is 
deterrence. The reasoning is that the possibility of liability for the unlawful 
conduct of their employees will encourage employers to take measures to 
diminish the risk of such conduct occurring.53 In Ikwezi the warning lights 
should have gone on when a man and a woman in an imbalanced power 
relationship often worked together after hours. This should have indicated 
to the Municipality that an increased risk existed that sexual harassment 
could take place. Had the Municipality acted on the possibility that sexual 
harassment could take place, the harassment could possibly have been 
prevented. Pickering J in Ikwezi remarked that although schedule 2 of the 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act54 32 of 2000 provides that "a 
staff member of a municipality may not embark on any actions amounting 
to sexual harassment", there was no evidence that the municipality trained 
its employees in this regard.55 Further, there was no evidence that the 
content of the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment 
in the Workplace was brought to the attention of the employees of the 
Municipality. 
6 Review of the decision of the chairperson of the 
disciplinary hearing by the Labour Court 
The court in Ikwezi pointed out that the wrong advice was given to the 
Municipality, namely that they could not do anything after the chairperson of 
the disciplinary hearing imposed the sanction.  
In the court's view, the inappropriate sanction should have been referred for 
review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. This section provides that 
                                            
51  Ikwezi para 76. 
52  Ikwezi para 76. 
53  Bazley para 28. 
54  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
55  Ikwezi para 79. 
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any action or decision of the state as employer may be referred to the 
Labour Court for review on any ground permissible in law.  
Two questions arise in this respect. Firstly, are decisions by chairpersons of 
disciplinary hearings involving the conduct of the employees of a 
municipality considered decisions of "the State as employer" and further, 
what would constitute "grounds permissible in law"? 
Municipalities are in terms of section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) without doubt organs of 
state. In terms of jurisprudence, the decision of a chairperson of a 
disciplinary hearing who acts on behalf of a municipality will be regarded as 
an act performed by the state in its capacity as employer56 and may 
therefore be referred for review in terms of section 158(1)(h).  
Regarding "grounds permissible in law", the court in Ikwezi analysed 
Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality,57 in which the particular municipality 
was successful in reviewing a decision of the chairperson of a disciplinary 
hearing. The Labour Court in that case stated that the municipality "had the 
right and was obliged to approach the Labour Court to review it where it 
failed to pass the test of rationality and reasonableness".58 Hendricks 
concerned an employee working for the Overstrand Municipality as Chief, 
Law Enforcement and Security. He was charged and found guilty inter alia 
of dishonesty in that he made false representations regarding his own speed 
fines. He moreover instructed junior colleagues to facilitate the false 
statements. The chairperson of the disciplinary hearing imposed a sanction 
of a final written warning valid for twelve months, as well as suspension 
without pay for a period of ten days.59  
Not happy with the decision, the Overstrand Municipality referred the 
decision to the Labour Court for review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the 
LRA. The municipality argued that because of the seriousness of the 
offence and the senior position held by the employee, the employment 
relationship had broken down and that a continued employment relationship 
would be intolerable. According to the municipality the sanction imposed by 
the chairperson was irrational and unreasonable, which was a ground for 
review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.60  
The Labour Court agreed with the municipality and set aside the sanction 
imposed by the chairperson. The employee took the decision on appeal, 
                                            
56  Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality 2014 12 BLLR 1170 (LAC) para 20 (hereafter 
the Hendricks case). 
57  Hendricks. 
58  Hendricks para 30. 
59  Hendricks para 5. 
60  Hendricks para 6. 
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arguing that in the light of the decisions in Chirwa v Transnet Limited61 and 
Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security62 the chairperson's decision could 
not be reviewed. The courts in these two judgments held that the unfair 
termination of the employment of public employees or unfair labour 
practices perpetrated by their employer, did not entitle them to seek 
remedies in terms of administrative law, but that they should make use of 
dispute resolution in terms of the LRA.63 The argument of the employee in 
Hendricks was that in the light of these judgments, the municipality could 
not rely on the grounds of irrationality and unreasonableness, which are in 
essence administrative-law grounds. The employee maintained that Gcaba 
overruled the decision in Ntshangase v MEC for Finance Kwa-Zulu Natal64 
(which lent support to a review procedure based on just administrative 
action).65  
In Ntshangase both the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) and the SCA held that 
since the court in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines66 had found that 
arbitration at the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA) constitutes administrative action, disciplinary hearings regarding 
state employees also constitute administrative action. Such a hearing must 
thus be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. If not, it does not amount 
to just administrative action and can be reviewed.67 The SCA in Ntshangase 
found further that since there was a breakdown of trust between the 
employer and employee, the decision of the chairperson not to dismiss the 
employee (who was found guilty on twelve counts of misappropriation of 
funds and dishonesty) was a decision that no reasonable person could 
reach on the facts of the case and was grossly unreasonable.68  
The LAC in Hendricks did not agree with the argument of the employee in 
that case, namely that Chirwa and Gcaba overruled Ntshangase, and the 
LAC consequently upheld the decision of the Labour Court. The LAC 
pointed out that in Chirwa the Constitutional Court held that when the state 
acts in its capacity as employer, the employee is well protected by the LRA 
and that there is no need for reliance on section 33 of the Constitution or 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 4 of 2000 (PAJA), which gives 
                                            
61  Chirwa v Transnet Limited 2008 29 ILJ 73 (CC) (hereafter the Chirwa case). 
62  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) (hereafter the Gcaba 
case). 
63  Chirwa paras 143-144; Gcaba para 64. 
64  Ntshangase v MEC for Finance Kwa-Zulu Natal 2010 3 SA 201 (SCA) (hereafter the 
Ntshangase case). 
65  Ntshangase para 19. 
66  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) (hereafter the Sidumo 
case). 
67  Ntshangase para 16. 
68  Ntshangase para 19. 
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effect to section 33.69 The LAC in Hendricks further remarked that in Gcaba 
the court agreed with Chirwa that public sector employees should use the 
remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices provided for in 
sections 191 and 193 of the LRA. The court in Hendricks further emphasised 
that the Chirwa and Gcaba decisions did not make a finding on section 
158(1)(h) of the LRA. It held as follows: 
The underlying guiding rationale of the ratio decidendi in Gcaba and Chirwa 
is that once a set of carefully-crafted rules and structures has been created 
for the effective and speedy resolution of disputes and protection of rights in 
a particular area of law, it is preferable that dismissal and unfair labour 
practices contained in the LRA should be used by aggrieved employees rather 
than seeking review under PAJA. The ratio cannot justifiably be extended to 
deny an employer a remedy against an unreasonable, irrational or 
procedurally unfair determination by a presiding officer exercising delegated 
authority over discipline. … The only remedy available to the employer 
aggrieved by the disciplinary sanction imposed by an independent presiding 
officer is the right to seek administrative law review; and section 158(1)(h) of 
the LRA empowers the Labour Court to hear and determine the review. To 
hold otherwise is to deny the employer any remedy at all against an abuse of 
authority by the presiding officer.70  
From the above it can be deduced that dismissal by the state does not entitle 
employees to administrative remedies (they will have to seek their remedies 
in terms of the LRA), but the state as an employer can allege that a decision 
of a chairperson was unreasonable and irrational, which are grounds for 
review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. 
Based on the above discussion, the Municipality in Ikwezi would probably 
have been successful had they referred the decision of the chairperson, 
described by the High Court as grossly unreasonable,71 for review. 
Was the sexual harassment sufficiently serious to constitute a breakdown 
in the employment relationship?72 If so, this would have constituted a ground 
for arguing that a sanction less than dismissal would be irrational and 
unreasonable and thus prone to be reviewed. If one considers the judgment 
in Campbell Scientific Africa (Pty) Ltd v Simmers,73 in which the harasser 
was dismissed for merely asking "Do you want a lover tonight?" the sexual 
assault in Ikwezi would no doubt constitute serious misconduct and would 
warrant dismissal. In Campbell the court remarked as follows on power 
relationships and sexual harassment: "At its core, sexual harassment is 
concerned with the exercise of power and in the main reflects the power 
                                            
69  Hendricks para 27. 
70  Hendricks para 27. 
71  Ikwezi para 37. 
72  See Edcon Ltd v Pillemer 2009 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA). 
73  Campbell; see further Grant, Whitear & Chandramohan 2017 ILJ 769. 
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relations that exist both in society generally and specifically within a 
particular workplace".74 
In the same vein, the court in Gaga v Anglo-Platinum Ltd75 remarked as 
follows: "By and large employers are entitled (indeed obliged) to regard 
sexual harassment by an older superior on a younger subordinate as 
serious misconduct, normally justifying dismissal".76 
There is no doubt that the sexual harassment of the plaintiff in Ikwezi was 
sufficiently serious to have caused a breakdown in the employment 
relationship. The nature of the act itself, the age difference between the 
victim and harasser, as well as the superior position of the harasser all point 
to a serious case of sexual harassment. A sanction short of dismissal was 
thus unreasonable and irrational and therefore a ground permissible in law 
that could be referred for review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.  
7 Measures available to employers outside section 
158(1)(h) of the LRA 
Although it falls outside the ambit of this case discussion, I briefly refer to 
the alternatives (outside section 158(1)(h) of the LRA) available to 
employers who are dissatisfied with the sanctions imposed by the 
chairpersons of disciplinary hearings. Since the review process in terms of 
section 158(1)(h) of the LRA is not available to private employers, they will 
have to make use of alternative measures. State organs may also make use 
of these alternative measures if referral for review is for some reason not 
appropriate.  
7.1 A second hearing 
Should employers retry employees in a second hearing, an employee may 
raise the issue of double jeopardy (accused persons should not be tried and 
disciplined twice for the same offence).77 The seminal case of BMW v De 
Lange78 considered whether second hearings of employees are 
permissible. Here the court held that fairness is the overriding consideration 
when deciding whether a second hearing could be held.79 However, the 
court cautioned that if the second hearing is "ultra vires the employer's 
disciplinary code … that might be a stumbling block. Secondly it would 
probably not be regarded to be fair … save in rather exceptional 
circumstances".80 In BMW the fact that new evidence emerged after the first 
                                            
74  Campbell para 20. 
75  Gaga v Anglo-Platinum Ltd 2012 33 ILJ 329 (LAC) (hereafter the Gaga case). 
76  Gaga para 48. 
77  Grogan Dismissal 251-258. 
78  BMW v De Lange 1999 ZALAC 28 (hereafter the BMW case). 
79  BMW para 12. 
80  BMW para 12. 
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hearing was regarded as exceptional circumstances which justified a 
second hearing. The test in BMW has been followed in several cases, 
namely Branford v Metrorail Services,81 YF and Multichoice Management 
Services,82 Theewaterskloof Municipality and Independent Municipal & 
Allied Trade Union on behalf of Visagie,83 the last two cases like Ikwezi 
dealing with sexual harassment. The disciplinary code for senior managers 
in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act does not contain any 
possibility of a second hearing or unilateral decision by management (an 
issue which is discussed in the next section) and no new evidence came to 
light after the hearing. It is thus doubtful whether a second hearing in Ikwezi 
would have been regarded as fair in terms of the BMW judgment.  
7.2 The employer unilaterally dismissing the employee 
In contrast to the lenient approach followed by the courts regarding the 
permissibility of second hearings, the LAC held in County Fair Foods (Pty) 
Ltd v Commissioner for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration,84 South 
African Revenue Services v Commissioner for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration85 and South Africa Revenue Services v Commissioner for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration86 that employers cannot unilaterally 
change a sanction imposed by a chairperson of a disciplinary hearing if no 
provision to that effect is made in the disciplinary code. Such a change, 
according to some of the judgments, would even be unlawful and invalid.87 
The effect of these decisions is that if a chairperson did not dismiss an 
employee, and the employer subsequently decided to dismiss the 
employee, the latter will remain in his or her position, because the 
employer's decision to dismiss would be invalid.88  
                                            
81  Branford v Metrorail Services 2003 24 ILJ 2269 (LAC). 
82  YF and Multichoice Management Services 2008 29 ILJ 2850 (ARB). 
83  Theewaterskloof Municipality and Independent Municipal & Allied Trade Union on 
behalf of Visagie 2012 33 ILJ 1031 (BCA).  
84  County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
2002 ZALAC 31 (11 December 2002) (hereafter the Country Fair Foods case).  
85  South African Revenue Services v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration 2014 35 ILJ 656 (LAC) (hereafter the Chatroogoon case).  
86  South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration 2016 37 ILJ 655 (LAC) (hereafter the Kruger LAC case). 
87  Kruger LAC. 
88  In contrast to these decisions, in PSA obo Venter v Laka 2005 26 ILJ 2390 (LC) the 
court found that s 17 of the Public Servants Act, 1994 trumps the disciplinary code 
(which did not make provision for the employer’s imposing a different sanction) which 
was a collective agreement, and which permits the executive authority to dismiss an 
employee. Grogan Dismissal 262 views this decision as one that should be "treated 
with great caution or be written off as an aberration". 
K CALITZ  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  17 
However, the Constitutional Court in South African Revenues Services v 
Commissioner for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration overruled this line 
of argument.89 In this case a white employee referred to black colleagues 
as "kaffirs" on two occasions. The chairperson of the disciplinary hearing 
imposed a sanction of a final written warning valid for six months and 
suspension without pay for ten days. The employee was further ordered to 
go for counselling.90 The disciplinary code, giving effect to a collective 
agreement, did not make provision for a unilateral change by management, 
but the SARS Commissioner nevertheless changed the final written warning 
to dismissal. Kruger was not given an opportunity to be heard.91 The 
employee referred an unfair dismissal to the CCMA where the arbitrator, in 
line with the decisions in County Fair Foods and South African Revenue 
Services v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration, reinstated 
him on the ground that the unilateral change was unlawful as the 
commissioner exercised powers that in terms of the disciplinary code were 
not his to exercise. Both the Labour Court and the LAC agreed with the 
CCMA.92  
Eventually the Constitutional Court found that the reinstatement of the 
employee after such serious misconduct which rendered the employment 
relationship intolerable was a decision that (in light of Sidumo) no 
reasonable decision maker would take.93 The court did, however, award 
damages to the employee on the ground that the dismissal was procedurally 
unfair.94 The decision of the employer to dismiss the employee, contrary to 
the decision of the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing, was thus 
apparently regarded as substantively fair. The issue of the employer's 
unilateral decision which according to the lower courts was invalid, was not 
before the court as SARS only challenged the reasonableness of the 
reinstatement. The Constitutional Court placed substance above form which 
is, considering the seriousness of the offence in the South African context, 
to be welcomed. The situation appears to be that if an employer unilaterally 
dismisses an employee after a sanction short of dismissal by the disciplinary 
chairperson, and an arbitrator reinstates the employee, a court could decide 
(after having regard to the seriousness of the misconduct) that the 
arbitrator's award is a decision that no reasonable decision maker could 
                                            
89  South African Revenue Services v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration 2017 38 ILJ 97 (CC) (hereafter the Kruger CC case). 
90  Kruger CC para 16. 
91  Kruger CC para 17. 
92  South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration 2010 32 ILJ 1238 (LC) and Kruger LAC. 
93  Kruger CC paras 34-44. 
94  Kruger CC para 58. 
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take. However, the lack of guidance on the aspect of the invalidity of a 
unilateral decision where the disciplinary code (often negotiated with the 
trade union) does not make provision for such a decision is disappointing 
and this issue calls for further research.  
8 Conclusion 
Allegations of sexual harassment by men in powerful positions, taking place 
in workplaces all over the world, brought to the fore by the #MeToo 
campaign, emphasise the need to focus on measures that will prevent the 
human damage caused by sexual harassment. In this article I have 
endeavoured to find answers to the question of why victims of sexual 
harassment often resign after such harassment. An analysis of the Ikwezi 
case provided some insight into the reasons for this phenomenon. In this 
case, the victim's symptoms of PTSD were aggravated when the harasser 
was not dismissed after a disciplinary hearing, because the victim had to 
continue working with him. As in many other cases of this kind, she could 
not cope with the effect that his presence had on her, with the result that 
she was forced to resign approximately one year after the incident.  
The court in Ikwezi rightly found that the Municipality was vicariously liable 
for the sexual harassment of its employee. Although the court embarked on 
developing the doctrine of vicarious liability so that it could include sexual 
harassment in the specific circumstances of Ikwezi, it was not strictly 
necessary. The High Court in Grobler HC had already developed the test 
for vicarious liability in similar circumstances, namely a man in a senior 
position harassing a woman who was his subordinate. In Grobler HC the 
creation of risk by the employer was considered an important factor in 
creating the sufficiently close connection (later also required by the 
Constitutional Court in K and F) between the employee's employment and 
the unlawful act to give rise to vicarious liability. The court in Ikwezi also 
emphasised the element of risk. This emphasis is to be welcomed, since 
employers will be encouraged to assess the risks of potential sexual 
harassment occurring in their business and will hopefully further be 
encouraged to take the necessary measures to lower that risk. Had the 
employer in Ikwezi assessed the risk of sexual harassment taking place in 
the particular circumstances (a senior male employee working after hours 
with a younger female in a junior position), measures including training for 
employees on the prohibition of sexual harassment could have been taken 
to avoid the incident.  
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A factor that contributed to the victim's damages in Ikwezi was the 
employer's ignorance of the fact that it had a common-law duty to ensure 
the physical and psychological safety of the victim during the entire 
employment relationship and not only up to the disciplinary hearing. Had the 
employer been alert to this duty, the victim would not have suffered the 
second trauma of having to continue working with her harasser, culminating 
in her having to resign. The Municipality conceded that they had failed in 
their duty to ensure the psychological safety of the employee before (but not 
after) the hearing. It is disappointing that the court did not point out that the 
employer could, in terms of the common law, be held directly (and not only 
vicariously) liable for failing to protect the employee's psychological safety 
during the whole period of employment. This would have sent a strong 
message to employers that if the harasser is not dismissed after the 
disciplinary hearing, the employer still has a duty to ensure the 
psychological safety of the victim. This could entail taking measures to 
ensure that there is no contact between the victim and the harasser.  
Damages to the victim in Ikwezi could further possibly have been avoided 
had the Municipality referred the sanction (short of dismissal) for review to 
the Labour Court in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. The Municipality 
was unfortunately wrongly advised by their legal advisor, that there was 
nothing that they could do about the unsatisfactory sanction. The High Court 
in Ikwezi pointed out that the requirements for review to the Labour Court 
would have been satisfied in Ikwezi, since a municipality is an organ of state, 
and further that the inappropriate sanction in this case was unreasonable 
and irrational and thus constituted a reason "admissible in law", which is 
required for referral for review in terms of this section. 
The procedure of referring an unsatisfactory decision of a chairperson of a 
disciplinary hearing for review is available only to organs of state; thus, 
private employers cannot make use of this procedure. They are left with a 
choice between a second hearing and a unilateral decision to dismiss the 
employee. These measures are arguably also available to organs of state 
which for some reason cannot refer the decision of the chairperson for 
review in terms of the LRA. In BMW fairness was laid down as a requirement 
for a second hearing. The court did remark that a second hearing would 
usually be possible only in exceptional circumstances and that a prohibition 
on a second hearing in the disciplinary code could be an obstacle. 
Regarding a unilateral change to the sanction, this was until recently held to 
be invalid if the disciplinary hearing did not make provision for such a 
change. However, in Kruger CC, a case of gross racist abuse, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the CCMA's reinstatement of an employee 
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who had been dismissed by a unilateral decision of management was a 
decision that no reasonable decision-maker would take. No guidance was 
provided on the question of whether an employer has the power to make 
such a unilateral change if the disciplinary code excludes this possibility. It 
appears that the Constitutional Court found that the unilateral decision of 
the employer was substantively fair. However, it found that the dismissal 
was procedurally unfair because Kruger had not been heard before the 
decision was taken. 
In summary, in Ikwezi both the human and financial cost of the harassment 
could have been prevented had the Municipality trained employees on the 
content of the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment 
in the Workplace, protected the victim even after the disciplinary hearing, 
and referred the case to the Labour Court for review. They could also have 
held a second hearing, although in the light of BMW this would probably not 
be regarded as fair, since no new evidence came to light after the first 
hearing. In the light of Kruger CC, the municipality could also have gone the 
route of a unilateral change to the sanction, although the Kruger CC case 
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